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Why Lawyers Should Oppose
Bar Integration
BY ALBERT L. VOGL*

A bill, sponsored not by the members of the bar association, but
by the board of governors of the Colorado Bar Association, has been
introduced into the 34th General Assembly. The purpose of this bill is
to provide for what is usually termed "An Integrated Bar" for the State
of Colorado. The bill authorizes the Supreme Court to "create an association * * * which shall consist of all persons in the state now or hereafter'regularly licensed to practice law in Colorado." The Supreme Court
is authorized to provide rules and regulations for the association; rules
and regulations concerning the conduct of the association and of its members; to provide a schedule of annual fees "to be paid by each member
to the Treasurer of the Colorado State Bar"' (note the fees are not to be
paid to the Supreme Court or to the Treasurer of the state of Colorado
but are to be paid to this association). For active members of the Bar
this fee, which of course is an excise tax, is to be not less than five nor
more than ten dollars per annum, "nonpayment of which shall be ground
for suspension" of the right to practice law in the state of Colorado.
The Supreme Court is authorized to provide ethical standards to be
observed in the practice of law, and to provide for discipline, suspension
or disbarment of association members; the Supreme Court may confer
the power of subpoena upon the association or its officers and committees
for the purpose of aiding in cases of discipline, suspension or disbarment
and may provide for the publication of the proceedings and records of the
association in the Colorado reports.
The foregoing is a fair and complete summary of the provisions of
the bill.
It will be noticed that the only powers which this bill confers upon
the association is to collect an annual excise tax of $5.00 to $1 0.00-the
exact amount to be fixed by the Supreme Court-and authority to aid
the Supreme Court in disciplinary, suspension or disbarment proceedings
under regulations and restrictions to be prescribed by the Supreme Court.
The bill says nothing as to bow the proceeds of this excise tax are to be
expended, does not require the treasurer of the association to account for
these proceeds to any public authority, and the only power specifically
given the Supreme Court in regard to this excise tax is to fix the amount
thereof between five and ten dollars per annum.
*Of the Denver Bar.
'Italics throughout are ours.
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Upon consideration of this proposal certain questions immediately
suggest themselves. Why was this particular time selected for the introduction of this measure? Was it because so many of the active lawyers
are now in service and it was thought that their absence would decrease
the opposition to this measure? Whether this was the reason or not, it is
evidently unjust to those absent for the cause mentioned, to take advantage of their absence to make such a radical change in the privileges
afforded by their license to practice law previously conferred on them.
Why was this matter rushed through in this unseemly haste without
taking an official canvass of the present members of the Bar, after reasonable time for discussion, to determine the wishes of the Bar? The president of the Colorado Bar Association stated publicly at a Denver luncheon that an informal canvass had been made and that the county Bars
were, with one exception, strongly in favor of it. Now we learn that an
actual canvass of one county seat, not the exception previously referred
to, resulted in substantially a two-to-one vote against it, and we know
that not even an informal canvass was taken in Denver.
When the Supreme Court in its letter of January 4, 1943, used the
phrase, "a short statute * * * fixing the maximum annual fee," why did
the sponsors of this bill fix a minimum as well as a maximum fee? Were
they unwilling to trust the Supreme Court in this matter?
What real changes are provided for in this proposed bill? The
Supreme Court now has the power to provide ethical standards to be
observed in the practice of law, and has already published a code of such
ethics; the Supreme Court now has the power to provide for disciplinary
action against members of the Bar and also has the power, and is now
exercising it, to call to its aid members of the Bar or committees of members to aid it in disciplinary as well as in other matters. These powers
have never been doubted. In these matters, therefore, the proposed bill
adds nothing to the powers already exercised by the Supreme Court.
The innovations which the bill does provide for are, the establishment
by rule of court of a state bar association with compulsory membership
therein and an annual excise tax payable to this association as a prerequisite of the right to continue in the practice of law.
One of the outstanding problems of our present governmental situation arises from excessive taxation for the maintenance of wasteful and
unnecessary bureaus and waste within the necessary bureaus; this integration proposal would add one new bureau and one new tax. It is
both unpatriotic or inexpedient to experiment with a new civil bureau
and a new tax for its support in these times when we are being urged to
put all spare funds into war bonds. An amusing, incidental sidelight
to this factor is that this tax would be deductible for income tax purposes, so, assuming the average lawyer now pays 20% of net income as
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federal and state income taxes, 20% of the aggregate of these association
dues will be deducted from income taxes and to that extent further complicate the general state and federal revenue situation. Let no one imagine
that this measure will unite the Bar; on the contrary it will divide it
between the tax-gatherer and the taxpayer; whoever heard of a popular
revenue agent? The officers of this new bar association may anticipate
being as popular as is the "Revenoor" in the South.
Why do these people who are urging Bar integration desire this
taxing power? They have answered that question in this language:
"It would be possible to maintain a central office supervised by a fullIn other words, it will create another job for a job
time secretary."
hunter. What we need today is fewer "full-time secretaries," fewer
"central offices," and to substitute encouragement of American individual
initiative in lieu of strangulation by bureaucratic regimentation.
The pamphlet issued by these "integrators" states: "One of the
truly difficult problems of the Supreme Court is the handling of disciplinary matters." The Constitution of Colorado provides that the
judges of the Supreme Court shall, on or before the first of December of
each year, report to the governor in writing, such defects and omissions
in the Constitution and laws as they may find to exist. It is strange
that the Supreme Court seems unaware of this, its "truly difficult problem," and has failed to follow the constitutional method of suggesting
the remedy. If this "truly difficult problem" is so acute, the remedy
would seem to be an appropriation by the legislature for the use of the
Supreme Court sufficient to enable it to engage such clerical and other help
as it may need for that purpose, not the creation of a new bureau, with
ill-defined authority, with tax-collecting powers but with no legislative
direction how the revenue so extorted shall be expended. We can assume
that when the Supreme Court needs the aid of an integrated Bar it will
ask for it in the manner prescribed by the Constitution of Colorado.
Until the Supreme Court does ask for it in the manner so prescribed
we can logically conclude that such help is not needed by our Supreme
Court.
Throughout the pamphlet issued by these "integrators" there are
frequent references to improved standards of ethics which will result from
this integrated Bar. One wonders who are these self-anointed superior
beings who are going to work these wonders of ethical culture in the
Bar; and, if these improvements in the standards are so necessary, why
are these "integrators" not more specific, why don't they tell us just
what they propose to do to us of the rank and file, why don't they point
out specifically the character of unethical practice they propose to eliminate? Certainly, this business of broadcasting these vague charges
against the Bar is itself unethical and even the hope of sufficient funds
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to create a new bureau with a central office and a full-time secretary is no
justification for defaming the Bar in this manner.
It is extremely doubtful whether the so-called integrated Bar could
undertake many of the activities these "integrators" mention in their
pamphlet. The proposed bill specifically mentions certain powers which
the Supreme Court may confer upon the integrated association, but many
of the activities which these "integrators" propose to undertake are certainly beyond the powers so conferred. As this new bureau is to be
supported by taxation, legislative authority for the use of the proceeds
of the tax must exist. The use of this tax money for many of the suggested activities is very questionable.
Congress passed certain laws which, it was assumed, authorized
labor unions to negotiate "closed shop" agreements. Because of the
abuses which have resulted therefrom, Congress-is now seriously considering amending those laws, at least insofar as closed shop agreements
relate to work in government employment or on government projects or
defense work. These "integrators" propose a "closed shop union" for
the Bar, and no lawyer may perform his duties as an officer of the courts
unless he carries his union card. Until we solve the present evils resulting from "closed shop" unions it would be unwise to create a new closed
shop union. The suggestion that such a union will create a "closer relationship with the judiciary of the state," if not sinister, is at least absurd
and wishful thinking. Are the members of the present bar associations
in any "closer relationship with the judiciary" than non-members? I
hope not, and I am confident that the fact that the non-members are
compelled to join the union by act of the legislature will not affect their
relationship to the judiciary.
These "integrators" place much reliance on the fact that twentythree states have adopted "integration."
Among those absent from the
roll call are such important states as New York, New Jersey, Illinois,
Ohio, Pennsylvania and Indiana; in fact, except for three southern states
and Michigan, no state east of the Mississippi River has adopted this
plan.. One of the integrated states is California, so we may assume the
recent Flynn trial is a sample of the showmanship of an integrated Bar.
Let me direct the attention of these "integrators" to the following
from the opinion of Mr. Justice Sutherland in the Carter Coal case:
"* * * in the very nature of things, one person may not be entrusted
with the power to regulate the business of another, and especially of a
competitor. And a statute which attempts to confer such power undertakes an intolerable and unconstitutional interference with personal liberty and private property. The delegation is so clearly arbitrary, and so
clearly a denial of rights safeguarded by the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment, that it is unrncessary to do more than refer to deci-
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sions of this Court which foreclose the question. " 2 An integrated Bar
gives to a group of lawyers regulatory powers over other lawyers, with
whom the members of the regulating group may be in competition.
Unless it does this it accomplishes nothing, and if it does this it is unconstitutional. Then why tax lawyers to maintain such an organization?
This scheme is the outgrowth of the epidemic for regimentation
which has afflicted this generation. Self-constituted supermen, confident
in their ability to regulate everybody in every activity of life, if they can
be assured of ample financial support from taxes, are attempting to create
innumerable bureaus, each with a central office and a full-time secretary
bent on exterminating individual initiative. Let the Bar of Colorado
be on its guard before it finds itself subjected to this strangulation process.
'Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 311. 56 S, Ct. 855, 80 L. ed. 1160

(1936).

Assistant United States Attorney General Berge
Discusses Responsibility of Prosecutors
The responsibility of prosecutors to see that defendants in criminal
cases, even in the trial of war crimes, are nor prejudiced by newspaper
publicity is discussed by Assistant United States Attorney General Wendell Berge in an article, The Prosecutorand Crime Publicity, in the February issue of the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JOURNAL.
Mr. Berge first discusses the responsibility of prosecutors generally
in criminal trials, declaring that "usually the prosecutor should share
the blame with the newspapers when they turn a criminal trial into a
Roman holiday."
In referring to trials of war crimes, he says:
"A state of war naturally and inevitably must create an intense public feeling. Anyone accused or even suspected of assisting
the enemy is at once covered with infamy in the public mind. Treason, for example, has always been regarded as the highest of crimes,
and properly so, but that is not to say that anyone accused of this
crime should be deemed to be convicted, or that lynch law is justified in regard to those suspected of treason. The same is true of
those accused'of other war crimes.
"It is so easy in time of war for a prosecutor to bolster a weak
case by appealing to the natural sentiments of the community.
Witch-hunting can be made very popular and a public official can
build for himself a tremendous reputation, at least of a temporary
nature, by an over-zealous drive against all those who do not see
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eye to eye with him or with the prevailing majority in regard to
the conduct of the war. Such a course of action is at least misguided patriotism, and may well amount to a perversion of the
essential features of the democracy and its judicial system, for the
continuation of which the war is being waged.
"The prosecutor must, of course, be ever on the alert to safeguard the national security and to make the processes of the criminal law reach down and punish all attempts to endanger the state
by the commission of any war crime. But in doing so the prosecutor must make sure that he is in fact serving the state, and that
he is not whipping up public hysteria to such an extent that a
criminal trial would be a farce. When justified by the facts, martial
law may be invoked to deal with threats against the safety of the
state. But as long as the civil courts are functioning, the prosecutor's responsibility continues to make sure that they function
according to law, that persons accused of heinous crimes against the
state are tried according to the law of the state and not according to
the misguided and uninformed emotions and prejudices that are on
the loose in the community.
"In trying war crimes the prosecutor must, above all, maintain balance and endeavor to see that news of such crimes is properly
presented to the people and that they are told all the facts, unless
military necessity requires in a particular case that secrecy be maintained. But he should use his best endeavor to make sure that they
are told facts and that they are not fed suspicion and unfounded
rumor, which might so easily prevent a defendant from being given
a fair trial to determine his actual guilt."
Pointing out that "certain kinds of crime publicity sometimes pervert the course of criminal justice," Mr. Berge asks what can be done
about it.
"We have a free press and we must preserve it. Repressive
legislation or administrative censorship over crime news would not
work. Nor do we want them. The evils attendant upon government control of crime news would undoubtedly outweigh the disadvantages of the present manner of handling such news. Education of public taste may to some extent raise the tone of reporting,
but there will always be that element of the reading public that
wants to eat its crime news raw, even without any seasoning. Part
of the press, at least, will always pander to this morbid interest.
To at.tempt the shortcut of forbidding or censoring crime news
would be a shallow and unrealistic approach to the problem. On
the other hand, it does not seem that we should give up in despair
and concede that nothing at all can be done to improve the character and quality of crime publicity.
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"Too often the sole responsibility for sensational handling is
laid at the door of the press. Although the press could no doubt
assume a greater responsibility for leadership in setting and maintaining higher standards, yet we must recognize frankly that newspapers and magazines must live in a competitive world; that they
must maintain circulation and sell advertising and that business
success depends upon printing what they can get and doing it in the
way in which the public wants it.
"Rather than unduly to criticize the press, lawyers should
examine their own professional standards and conduct to ascertain
whether they are not themselves largely to blame for the overemphasis of the sordid aspects of crime news. Particularly should
public prosecutors apply the searching light of critical examination
to their own actions.
"A realization of the high nature of his office will go a long
way toward helping a prosecutor keep a criminal trial as free as
possible of the evil influence of yellow journalism. The prosecutor
who scrupulously practices law instead of attempting to play politics, will not be tempted to shape up his case for newspaper headlines first and for justice afterward.
"Many criminal trials are dramatic, and legitimately so.
There is enough life in them without the artificial respiration that
is sometimes applied through the printing press, and the prosecutor
loses nothing by avoiding artificiality.
"In maintaining balance, the prosecutor must also be careful
to avoid the mistake of becoming secretive about matters which a
free press is entitled to know. When people have no information,
they proceed to create their own. Only recently, during the hearings held by a military commission trying eight Nazi saboteurs in
Washington, a rather rigid secrecy was maintained over a period
of days. This was not an ordinary criminal trial, and the military
authorities were entirely within their rights in doing whatever they
saw fit about the matter of publicity. Nevertheless, the question of
whether the public should have been given a certain minimum of
information instead of none at all was considered at least an arguable point, and some concession was finally made, but in the meantime, lacking news, one or two reporters did create their own. Their
information was not wholly correct, but that did not prevent them
from giving it to the public.
"In the usual criminal case, reporters and the public do have
a right to learn the facts of the trial. Reporters feel that they have
a right to all the facts they can get, and if they are subjected to a
restraint that is unreasonable, they are likely to resent it and to
tackle the problem through other channels. The result may be an
embarrassment to the prosecutor, sometimes not undeserved."

